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Abstract: The article surveys the recent scholarly study of religion and international relations/International
Relations (ir/IR). The focus of the article is on two discrete periods: pre-11 September 2001 (‘9/11’)
and post-9/11. During the first time period, Iran’s Islamic revolution (1979), the civil war in former
Yugoslavia and Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (1993) were major foci of attention. The second
period saw a large number of scholarly accounts following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, with a
sustained focus on the international securitisation of Islam. The article also briefly surveys the
position of religion in IR theory. The article concludes that following the recent diminution of the
threat to the West of Islamist terrorism—subsequent to the apparent demise of Islamic State and the
fragmentation and dissipation of al Qaeda—the study of religion in IR theory needs to take better
account of changing circumstances to arrive at an improved understanding of how religion impacts
on international relations/International Relations.
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1. Introduction
Thinking about the association of religion and international relations, what do we
know and how do we know it? In recent decades, much attention has been paid to how
religion impacts upon international relations; not all of it has come from International
Relations (IR) scholars. This may be because, as a discipline, IR was initially slow to
take religion seriously, with many IR scholars apparently reluctant to accept religion’s
significance in IR and factor into their analyses. Reus-Smit notes that both religion and
culture1 were ‘largely neglected’ in IR until the al Qaeda attacks on the Pentagon and
New York’s Twin Towers on 9/11. Prior to 9/11, however, two developments also caught
the attention of some analysts: Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Huntington (1993,
1996) ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm; 9/11 significantly added to these, and together
they have helped to sustain a focus on religion in IR over the last few decades. The topic
first appeared of significance in IR because Iran’s Islamic Revolution led to widespread
apprehension that the new revolutionary government would seek to spread its radical
agenda to the Muslim ummah via Iran’s foreign policy, much as the post-revolutionary
government in the Soviet Union had sought to spread its revolution six decades earlier to
those it believed would respond favourably to its appeals.
A consequence of 9/11 and its aftermath—especially, the US-led ‘war on terror’ and
increasing securitisation of Islam (Haynes 2018, 2019)—was an increased focus on religious
ideas, especially Islamist extremism and terrorism. It also led to a renewed focus on
Huntington’s clash of civilisations paradigm, which focused on ‘The West’ and ‘Islam’ as
radically different concepts, informed by dissimilar ideas and values. Each was constituted,
according to Huntington, in relation to state power and ”mobilized to sustain system-
transforming political projects, either on the part of liberal democracies, seeking to redefine
the norms of sovereignty and global governance, or terrorist organisations seeking an end
to the liberal capitalist world order” (Reus-Smit 2005, p. 211).
In addition, the last few decades saw a pronounced trend to proclaim a global religious
resurgence and ‘post-secular’ international relations (Thomas 2005; Toft et al. 2011). This
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is not to assert that significant actors in IR have essentially changed in recent years: the
terrain is still dominated by powerful states. Yet, in certain contexts and in relation to
some issues, various religious non-state actors, including Islamic State, al Qaeda, and the
Holy See, also need to be taken into account. On the one hand, states (or governments,
both terms are frequently employed in the IR literature) in various ways, contexts and
with assorted outcomes, may link policies to overtly religious concerns so as to justify
or legitimate specific foreign policies, such as the sustained US support for international
religious freedom since the Clinton presidency in the 1990s. On the other hand, as already
noted, non-state actors may also, at times, be significant for our understanding of the role
of religion in international relations.
Building on Huntington (1993, 1996) analysis, Thomas (2005) focuses on non-state
”religious traditions or movements” which affect international relations in three main ways:
impact on international conflicts, for better or for worse; seek to change international
society’s norms, values, or institutions and help amend a state’s foreign policy. On the
first point, the nature of international conflict changed since the end of the Cold War,
characterised by a relative scarcity of interstate wars and more intrastate conflicts. For
example, in the 1990s, there were more than 100 major conflicts, with over 1000 fatalities in
each, but only a handful were interstate wars. Instead, most were intrastate conflicts; one
in 14 (7 percent) were judged to be ‘communal’ wars, with prominent religious, ‘cultural’
or ethnic division and strife. To some extent, such communal issues replaced extant secular
ideologies—including, communism and socialism—as key sources of identity, competition
and conflict in international relations. The widespread eruption of communal conflicts
cast serious doubt on the potential to move from the bipolar Cold War order—rooted
in secular ideological division—to a new configuration characterised by (the pursuit of)
peace, prosperity and cooperation. These concerns were highlighted in the brief focus on a
‘new world order’ highlighted by US President George H. W. Bush in the early 1990s. The
focus was, however, short-lived, as the inter-communal wars in former Yugoslavia of that
decade, as well as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and the West’s punitive response, highlighted
the return of communal strife and made achievement of a new world order impossible.
Thomas’ analysis was highly influential in developing attention to religion’s presence in IR
and today, more than 15 years after publication, is still widely regarded as a benchmark in
the development of our understanding of this phenomenon.2
While it is not always regarded as a significant component of religion’s return to
international relations, the civil war in former Yugoslavia (1991–2001) is one of the most
important events to reignite interest in national and international relationships involving
culture, ethnicity and religion. The civil war in former Yugoslavia—between Muslim
Bosnians, Catholic Croats, and Orthodox Serbs—drew in jihadis, the Holy See and Moscow,
and, in effect, was a new “hot” war in microcosm focusing on culture, religion and eth-
nicity/nationalism). This was not widely foreseen by IR researchers who tried to apply
traditional IR paradigms to explain the changes. Maybe we should have seen this coming,
given that the Soviet Empire had been undermined a few years earlier by rising religion,
culture and ethnicity/nationalism in previously loyal satellite states, such as Poland. These
changes and their aftermath took the attention of researchers, including Huntington, to the
role of religion in IR in the early 1990s, but it took 9/11 to fully to cement this attention.
Religious differences were key to the Yugoslavia conflict, similarly as they had been to
the earlier conflict between Iran and Iraq (1980–1988), the most destructive (of life) conflict
since World War II.3 In both wars, religious differences were central to engendering and
influencing individual and group values—factors that can affect formulation and execution
of states’ foreign policies, as the Iran-Iraq war demonstrated. This is because religion is
an important source of basic value orientations both for individuals—including political
leaders—and for communities in countries around the world. This can clearly have major
social and political connotations, enabling religion to be “a mobiliser of masses, a controller
of mass action . . . an excuse for repression [or] an ideological basis for dissent” (Calvert
and Calvert 2001, p. 140).
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Second, Thomas notes that the relationship between “international society”—defined
as the free association of autonomous countries engaging on the basis of shared interests,
values, and norms—and internationally-significant non-state religious actors was also a
significant issue after the Cold War. Finally, several states are noted for the overt intrusion
of religion into their foreign policies in recent decades, including Turkey and the USA
(Öztürk 2021; Haynes 2021).
We can draw several conclusions from Thomas’s comments. First, in recent years,
the association of religion to both state and non-state actors’ policies and actions have
become important for understanding international outcomes in many parts of world. This
is a novelty, because International Relations has long seen the international system as a
demonstrably secular one. The fundamental secular norms of international relations were
enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648)—particularly the notion of state restraint in
religious matters, and the gradual privatisation of the latter, implying political marginalisa-
tion. This encouraged a strong belief among most IR scholars that international relations
discourse is predominantly secular. Second, religion influences international outcomes
involving international society. Finally, all religious actors’ influence in international rela-
tions is linked to their ability to exercise ideational power. Both states and non-state actors
can be influential in this regard. Toft et al. (2011) share these concerns, assessing whether
religion is a force for good or evil in world politics. The not very surprising conclusion is
that it can be both, depending on the actor, the circumstances and the context.
The current article surveys the recent scholarly study of religion and international re-
lations/International Relations’ (ir/IR).4 The focus of the article is on two discrete periods:
pre-9 September 2001 (‘9/11’) and post-9/11. During the first time period, Iran’s Islamic rev-
olution (1979) and Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ (1993) were major foci of attention.
The second period saw a large number of scholarly accounts following the 9/11 attacks on
the USA, with a sustained focus on the international securitisation of Islam. The article also
briefly surveys the position of religion in IR theory. The article concludes that following the
recent diminution of the threat to the West of Islamist terrorism—subsequent to the appar-
ent demise of Islamic State and the fragmentation and dissipation of al Qaeda—the study
of religion in IR theory needs to take into account the changing circumstances to arrive at
a better understanding of how religion impacts on international relations/International
Relations.
The research design of the article is to assess the significance of religion in international
relations over time, both in relation to empirical events and to IR theory. Regarding
the first—empirical events—the article claims that what happens in the ‘real world’ in
relation to religion’s role in international relations, is the main driver of developments in
IR theory associated with religion. For example, Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979 led to
a focus on the international effects of the revolution, via Iran’s foreign policy, while 9/11
galvanised two decades of focus—some would say obsession—with the impact of Islamic
extremism and terrorism as it affected international relations. Therefore, the time period the
article examines is post 1979—it focuses on certain significant events during that 40-year
period; and briefly examines how IR theory has sought to incorporate those events into its
understanding. In other words, reference to 1979 underlines the importance of a long-term
approach to understand IR’s engagement with religion. Several contributors to this debate
are focused upon in this article, including Sandal and Fox, Thomas, Huntington, Kubálková
and Hurd. They are selected because of their theoretical and empirical importance: these
are the people most often cited in assessments of religion in ir/IR and, as such, it is
appropriate to look at their arguments in some detail. The overall ‘point’ of the article is
however modest: it seeks to organise and, to a limited degree, deepen existing knowledge
about research on religion in IR and the role of the state in this context. Hopefully, this
would motivate other researchers to develop related knowledge further.
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2. Religion and International Relations: Who Cares and Why?
Recent discussion on the ‘Religion and International Relations’ Facebook page
https://www.facebook.com/groups/336226026577855 (accessed on 7 May 2021) and on
the ‘Religion and International Relations’ website https://religion-ir.org/ (accessed on 7
May 2021) indicates that the subject matter of religion and international relations is not
fixed but varies widely among those interested in the topic. Related scholarship focuses on,
inter alia, new, more quasi-religious frames to foreign policy issues linked to ascendant
neo-nationalist and populist political parties in Europe, Turkey and elsewhere (Haynes
2021; Cesari 2021; Öztürk 2021). Others point to how intersectional identities of gender
and religion impact women’s experience in times of conflict and political violence where
religious narratives are used to justify the conflict or mobilise supporters (Jenichen 2021).
Transnational religious activism (for example, churches in the US lobbying in Uganda on
gay rights issues) also takes scholarly attention, as does the topics of religion and the climate
emergency and the role of religious movements in disaster relief (Marshall 2021). A further
topic also engaging attention is the resurgence of civil religion and its surprising alliance
with traditional faiths, a consequence of the increasingly blurred line between the ‘religious’
and the ‘secular’ as, for example, expressed in novel expressions of “Christianism” in
Europe (Brubaker 2017) and the USA (Haynes 2021; Ryan 2021), and in nativist religious
traditions around the world (including in India), amalgams of nationalism, religion, and
cultural myth (Religion 2021). Here, the focus is on how religion and politics frequently
cut across the national/international divide, implying overlap between the domestic and
the external.
These are wide-ranging concerns, and it seems clear that the rather single-minded
fixation on 9/11 and its aftermath is now past. The current situation of diverse foci in
analyses of religion and international relations contrasts with the position in the recent past,
where most attention was on the threat to international order and stability from Islamist
extremism and terrorism. The lack of a common focus in the current study of religion and
international relations has not prevented it from becoming an established, albeit still quite
marginal field of study within the discipline of International Relations. This can be shown in
two main ways. First, the topic has recently become an institutionalised subject area within
the IR scholarly community. For example, the US-based International Studies Association
(ISA), the world’s largest professional gathering of IR scholars, established a dedicated
section—‘Religion and International Relations’, known for short as REL—in 2013. In 2021,
REL had 212 members—a relatively small section of the ISA, with its overall 5500 members,
that is, 3.8% (2021 data). This confirms that there is a small percentage of ISA members—
half of whom are based in North America, with the rest located elsewhere in the world,
mostly in the Global North with relatively few in the Global South—interested enough in
studying and researching religion in international relations to pay USD 5 annually for REL
membership, in addition to the yearly cost of ISA membership, typically USD 100 or more.
Another way of gauging the importance of a topic is: Does it have a dedicated
scholarly journal? Religion and international relations has one such journal: The Review
of Faith and International Affairs (RFIA), whose website proclaims it is an ”international
journal publishing innovative research and policy-relevant analysis on the role of religion
in global affairs and public life worldwide” https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rfia20/
current (accessed on 7 May 2021). In 2021, RFIA was in the 19th year of publication, with
four issues a year. The four most read RFIA articles were, in March 2021: “Culture, Religion,
and Freedom of Religion or Belief”; “Economic Impacts of Child Marriage: A Review of the
Literature”; “Child Marriage: A Critical Barrier to Girls’ Schooling and Gender Equality in
Education”; and “Introduction: The “Clash of Civilizations” and Relations between the
West and the Muslim World”. It will be noted that only one of these ‘most read’ articles
focused on one of the core topics within religion and international relations: the ‘clash of
civilisations’. It suggests that most attention from RFIA readers is on non-traditional topics:
freedom of religion, culture, child marriage and education. Moreover, over its two decades
of existence, very few articles in RFIA have focused on theoretical issues in the study of
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religion and international relations. It seems clear that RFIA is a journal most interested in
religion-in-international-relations not religion-in-International Relations. What does this
tell us about the position of religion in IR theory?
3. Religion in International Relations Theory: What Do We Know and How Do We
Know It?
Forty years after Iran’s Islamic Revolution, three decades after Huntington (1993)
much-cited article in Foreign Affairs, ”The Clash of Civilizations?” and 20 years after 9/11,
what IR scholars are studying when they examine ‘religion’ is varied. The REL section of
ISA was founded following the efforts of Ron Hassner, a professor at UC Berkeley, whose
research interests are, as listed on his Google Scholar page: international security, religion
and international affairs, religion and conflict, and Israel studies https://scholar.google.
com/citations?user=odF2zi8AAAAJ&hl=en (accessed on 7 May 2021).5 Hassner’s research
profile is typical of many scholars, especially those based in North America, who focus
on the topic of religion in international relations. Many are concerned with international
conflict and security studies, often focusing on Islamist extremism and terrorism. Others,
including Thomas (2005), Dallmayr (2004) and Petito (2009) are more interested in the role
of religion in international co-operation, in relation to, inter alia, efforts to tackle pressing
global problems, such as: human rights, the climate emergency and barriers to improved
international religious freedom. The latter issue, in particular, receives much attention
from IR scholars, including RFIA, especially those located or interested in the USA, where
successive presidents—from Clinton (1992–1998) to Trump (2017–2021)—made it a key
concern of US foreign policy.6
Such scholars do not, however, share a theoretical understanding of how religion
influences outcomes in IR. Mainstream and established theories and paradigms—including
realism, liberalism, critical theory and constructivism, do not consistently consider religion
in their analyses. Why? For many:
The assumption that the religious revival in today’s world heralds a new era is
not supported by the evidence. Data and analysis both suggest a continuing,
complex, hierarchical and multipolar, but also interdependent and multilateral,
global system. Those acting under the inspiration of a creed will, in the long run, have
to adapt to the secular concepts that underpin the foundations of the world order rather
than the other way around (emphasis added; Merlini 2011, p. 127)
Merlini mentions the inspiration of a “creed” in understandings of the world. What
is a creed? It is a belief, particularly a religious one. An example of a creed is faith in the
Christian religion, expressed in the ‘Father, Son and the Holy Spirit. Unlike ‘hard-headed’
realists with their positivist take on how the world works, those influenced by a ‘creed’ are
indulging in unwarranted faith that the world can be improved by religious efforts. There
is a pejorative connotation to Merlini’s comment, underlining a common understanding of
many ‘mainstream’ IR scholars, that religion is destined to fade from public prominence in
line with the modernist ‘creed’ of secularisation theory.
Nevertheless, the fact that religion did not fade from public prominence ensured that
its role in international relations would require a theoretical understanding to explain
this outcome. Over the last two decades, scholars have sought to develop theories of
how we should understand the role(s) of religion in international relations (including
Fitzgerald 2011; Fox and Sandal 2013; Huntington 1993, 1996; Hurd 2008; Kubálková 2000;
Thomas 2005). Contrary to the already-noted assertions of Merlini, Snyder (2011) claims
that “Religious concerns stand at the center of international politics’. However, if religion
stands at the ‘center of international politics;’ then it cannot be of such unimportance that
‘secular concepts [still] underpin the foundations of the world order”. Both cannot be
right! Merlini is claiming that although there is ‘more’ religion in international relations
compared to the past, this does not imply that we need to change how we understand how
the world works because it is relatively inconsequential compared to traditional forms of
influence, such as military, financial and diplomatic power. Snyder begs to differ.
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It would be very difficult to claim authoritatively that the fundamentals of interna-
tional relations have decisively changed as a result of what some see as a near-global
religious resurgence. In this regard, there is no compelling evidence of which I am aware
that ‘post-secular’ international relations is substantially different from ‘secular’ interna-
tional relations, which evolved following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. How do we
resolve this conundrum: that is, religion is significant in understanding international rela-
tions versus religion is insignificant in understanding international relations? To examine
this question, this section briefly surveys how ‘religion’ is understood theoretically within
the discipline of IR, concisely looking at the work of several leading IR scholars in this
regard.
Some scholars criticise the discipline of IR for ignoring or downplaying the impact of
religion in international relations. The claim is that inadequate theories lead to inadequate
policies, which may have dramatic consequences. For example, as Pollinder (2021) notes,
if the United States government led by President Jimmy Carter had taken the role and
significance of religion more seriously, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 might not have come
as such a surprise, and with such major—and continuing—effects on US foreign policy
under successive US presidents.
Do we need a new theory to satisfactorily explain how religion influences outcomes in
international relations or can existing theoretical frameworks tell us what we want to know?
Three of the most significant theoretical approaches applied to the study of international
relations—realism, liberalism and constructivism—all struggle to factor religion into their
paradigms. As Snyder (2011, p. 1) puts it, ”the main canonical works of international
relations theory, which continue to shape much empirical academic work, hardly mention
religion”.
The relative inattention can be explained in part by the fact that some prominent
international relations scholars do not believe it necessary or appropriate to amend their
normal conceptual frameworks by incorporating religious concerns into their analyses.
None of the foundational accounts of the three main IR paradigms—that is, (Kenneth
Waltz [1979] 2010) in relation to realism, Michael Doyle (1986) and Robert Keohane (1984),
focusing on liberalism, and Alexander Wendt (1999) on constructivism—pay any attention
to religion, presumably deeming that it is too unimportant to warrant their attention.
Realists ask: How many divisions has the Pope? This refers to the notion that the soft
power of religion cannot hope to be a plausible counter for military force’s hard power.
For their part, Liberals seem to accept the major claim of secularization theory: religion is
declining as a public actor and as a result is becoming irrelevant in international relations.
Finally, constructivism sees a central role for identity, norms and culture. Potentially, it is
a more fertile environment to include religion analytically; it is strange, then, that Wendt
fails to mention religion in what many regard as his field-defining contribution (Wendt
1999). Another prominent constructivist, Vendulka Kubálková, tried to factor religion into
constructivist analysis with, as we shall see, mixed results.
In short, the three main IR theories say little or nothing about religion. To some
extent, this was because much of the definitive work in this regard was published prior
to the intrusion of religion into IR from the early 1980s; certainly, it was before 9/11,
which led to an explosion of interest. In addition, the lack of concern was linked to
the background, history and development of the discipline of IR, which occurred in the
context of an overtly secular international environment following World War One. More
generally, for long periods, international relations, especially in the West, was both state-
focused and non-religious in outlook. Very few states—especially in the secular West—
consistently expressed an organising ideology which consistently involved religion. Instead,
secular ideologies, such as liberal democracy, capitalism, socialism, social democracy and
communism, were paramount. However, as Snyder notes, things clearly changed with
9/11.
Since 11 September 2001, religion has become a central topic in discussions about
international politics. Once Islamic terrorism put religion in the international
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spotlight, this realm suddenly seemed to teem with lively issues: the foreign
policy predilections of the [US] Christian Right towards Israel and Southern
Sudan, the complications of faith-based Western activism abroad, the Dalai Lama
and the Falun Gong as potential destabilizers of officially atheist but increasingly
neo-Confucian China, and the Myanmar military regime’s fear of a potential
alliance of Burmese monks and international refugee organizations. Perhaps
religious international politics had been there all along, but it suddenly became
harder to ignore (Snyder 2011, p. 1)
Snyder mentions three of the world faiths—Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. We
could add both the influence of Hinduism in India’s foreign policy, especially in relation to
(Muslim) Pakistan during the rule of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata party, both in
the late 1990s and at the time of writing (mid-2021), and that of Jewish political parties in
Israel regarding the mainly Muslim Palestinians and the status of Jerusalem, a holy city
for Jews, Muslims and Christians. Overall, there was a significant shift in world politics
post-9/11, leading to increased attention to religion in the perceived shift to ‘post-secular’
international relations (Habermas 2006; Barbato and Kratochwil 2008). While such a shift is
open to question and still controversial, the apparent resurgence of religion has been noted
on many levels of social activity—including international relations/International Relations.
Overall, this significantly undermines the deep-rooted, secular stubbornness of Western
social sciences to take religion seriously.
As the 21st century progresses, there is growing attention on cultural7 explanations
for outcomes in international relations. They have been highlighted in the reorganisation
of world politics that followed the end of the Cold War and the associated impact of deep-
ening globalisation—the work of Huntington is a key example in this regard. As Brown
(2005, p. 48) notes, “theorists of globalization reject the state-centrism involved in many
IR approaches in favour of an approach that stresses global social, economic, cultural and
political forces”. This encourages some IR theorists to engage with the issue of ‘cultural
globalisation’ as a central facet of globalisation more generally (Beyer 2014). This issue also
highlights the hitherto Eurocentric nature of IR theory and suggests that to understand
religion in IR theory more generally, we need to bear in mind that the intrusion of new
global actors into international relations implies that our theories to understand IR need
to change too. Early thinking and argumentation about globalisation tended to focus on
supposed cultural changes brought about by the sudden near-global dissemination of
identical consumer goods and a ‘Westernised’—or, American(ised)—cultural intrusion.
Publicised by Western—especially, US-based transnational corporations—to Latin America,
Asia, and elsewhere in the global south, it was widely asserted that cultural Westerni-
sation/Americanisation fatally subverted local cultures, by encouraging local people to
become ‘consumers’ of Western goods and services to the disadvantage of those produced
locally. Together, the ‘media revolution’ characteristic of post-Cold War globalisation and
the growth of consumerism help swiftly to undermine formerly autonomous cultures and
values, replacing them with a Westernised ‘global culture’ of Hollywood, McDonald’s,
Coca-Cola, and Microsoft. Some also comment on the impact of American evangelicals
spreading ‘Americanised’ brands of Christianity to the global south (McAlister 2018)
Representative of the first ‘wave’ of critical analysis of globalisation, Saurin (1995,
p. 256) contended that individualistic cultures had the potential of being a major political
force, to the extent that they would threaten both the basis of the existing divided state
system and nationalism, its major supporting structure. Saurin asserted that the reason
for this was that “culture avoids being located and tied down to any definable physical
space”. On the other hand, both nationalism and ethnic awareness are, at the same
time, significant cultural components disseminated around the world, to become both
a globalised and a globalising phenomenon. One of the main causes of contemporary
ethnic and religious conflict in many countries, such as former Yugoslavia and India, is
awareness, via globalisation, of what other groups around the world are doing, and with
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this knowledge, seeking to emulate their counterparts’ struggles for greater power in
relation to their own countries in relation to an identified ‘other’.
Central to dissemination around the globe of what some claim is an increasingly
globalised culture and ideas is individualistic, rather than communal, values. This is
noticeable in the widespread clamour for more and improved (individualistic) human
rights. To be sure, some entities, such as Islamist extremists and terrorists as well as
some Asian governments, including that of China, seek to counter this development;
therefore, it is difficult to deny that human rights issues are now widely perceived as
worldwide problems, necessitating global solutions. This stimulated the development
of international organisations and institutions seeking to address such issues; some are
religious, either inter-faith or linked to a specific creed. This development has also fuelled
the development of global or transnational civil society, whereby cross-border groups
and grassroots organisations from all parts of the world interact in pursuit of certain
international outcomes (Haynes 2012).
This has come in the context of the post-Cold War revival of ‘identity politics’. A
striking feature of the post-Cold War era is the increasing number of people who adopt
a social, political and cultural identity based on, but not necessarily restricted narrowly
to, a specific and autonomous religious creed. These include Islamists of various kinds,
Christian evangelicals, and Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish and Sikh nationalists.
Clearly, identity matters; in IR theory, constructivism has done some regional studies, such
as that of the Middle East and that of South Asia, a service in providing an influential
theoretical approach to understanding regional outcomes. On the other hand, constructivist
accounts often overlook the material context of identity and, as a result, are as mistaken
as materialist attempts to reduce it to only a minor issue. This is because material and
normative variables are autonomous, while a steady social order depends on an interactive,
relatively harmonious relationship. Hinnebusch comments that
When norms do not correspond to material structures, the former lack the mate-
rial anchor to endure and the latter the legitimacy to survive without the continual
application of coercive power. Arguably, the main source of the enduring instabil-
ity of the Middle East is the continuing contradiction between externally imposed
structures (the fragmenting states system, the region’s international dependency)
and the region’s Arab and Islamic identities (Hinnebusch 2005, p. 170).
To comprehend this dynamic, it is useful to utilise a theoretical approach that is
informed by material structures and norms and their interaction with interests and identity;
to do this, we need to bridge the constructivist-materialist division. One compromise might
be to employ constructivist methods as the first stage in tracing how domestic identity
shapes states’ conceptions of their interests. This might be more fruitful than starting from
the position that states’ wealth and power is the primary component of their regional or
global position before adding further dimensions such as nationalism or religion to help
shape a notion of interest putting a high value on regional autonomy.
In sum, post-Cold War globalisation is widely linked to metaphors such as ‘the hol-
lowed out state’ and ‘a borderless world’. The main focal point is, of course, countries’
changing economic, political and cultural arrangements. The outcome is a reduction of
what was once believed to be a primary attribute of statehood: a country’s ‘hard’ boundaries
and associated ability to control domestic environments. The implication is that globalisa-
tion undermines governments’ ability to make autonomous, definitive decisions regarding
their course of action. Put another way, the ‘globalisation thesis’ is destructive of the main
fundaments of IR analysis. This is that the globe is filled with: (1) autonomous political
territories presided over authoritatively sovereign, national governments (2) nation-states
and (3) national economies. Collectively, they were understood to be the ‘natural’, world-
wide units central to understanding how political and political economic arrangements
‘worked’. The globalisation thesis significantly questions these long-standing assumptions.
Questioning state-centric dominance of international relations theory necessarily
highlights the potential significance of non-state actors, both secular and those motivated
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by religion. It also leads to a focus on significant transnational networks which can affect
international outcomes. Students of IR have long been aware of the claim that the ‘nation-
state is in retreat’. As long ago as the late 1960s and the 1970s, the question was asked in
the IR literature if the state was ‘becoming obsolete’? There was no conclusive answer,
but it did not stop the question being asked over time. There were various points of
view, including the state-centric (or billiard ball) international model and the ‘cobweb’
model, informed by the understanding that the state’s autonomy was being significantly
affected by burgeoning transnational connections between people and organisations. Later,
in the 1980s, the state made a comeback. IR specialists saw, for the most part, that it
was still highly significant. Later, in the 1990s, as already noted, the globalisation thesis
once again questioned the significance of the state and its autonomy, with some claiming
that burgeoning global civil society further undermined the state’s ability to dominate
international relations (Haynes 2005).
How might religion be brought into, and augment and illustrate, existing concepts,
theories, or paradigms of international relations? Or, do we need new ones as a result of
the wide-ranging concerns of religion and international relations in the third decade of the
21st century? In Religion and International Relations Theory, Fox and Sandal (2013) suggest
that religion can be incorporated into mainstream IR theoretical paradigms: realism and
liberalism. Sandal and Fox’s analysis seeks to accommodate the varying ways that religion
impacts on international relations by adapting IR analysis to incorporate religion. They
seek to develop a wide-ranging analysis whereby religion affects outcomes in international
relations in various ways, then assess what they have discovered in relation to how the
various facets of religion can be explained by use of mainstream—that is, secular—IR
theories. For Troy, the outcome is interesting but undermined by the approach of Fox
and Sandal, which he claims is ‘inevitably reductive’, providing ”sometimes idiosyncratic
readings and interpretations of the already existing theoretical framework . . . for example,
Realism” (Troy 2015).
For Scott Thomas (2005), things need to be looked at differently. Published in 2005,
Thomas starts his book by describing three (relatively) recent events of significance for
analysis of religion and intranational relations: the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Polish
“Revolution” (1989) and 9/11. He shows that in each case, policymakers and practitioners
were informed and guided by secular explanations. As a result, they overlooked religious
aspects of international affairs and failed to address them adequately. For Thomas, this
demonstrates the heretofore marginalisation of religion and culture in international rela-
tions, and the importance of consistently factoring in such concerns into analysis. A later
contribution from Thomas (2014) underlines that the ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ spheres are
not two absolutely distinct configurations of power. Instead, ”What counts as religious,
secular or political in any given context is not only socially constructed; it is a function
of different configurations of power surrounding the construction of the categories the
religious, the secular and the political—and the boundaries between them” (Thomas 2014,
p. 317).
Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996) influential ‘clash of civilisations’ paradigm is notable
for seeing religion and culture as a central component of a novel theoretical understanding
of International Relations. For Huntington, religion/culture is so central to outcomes that
they supplant existing paradigms and become the key explanatory variable for thinking
about the issues. None of the 10 contributors to Snyder (2011) much-cited edited book
on religion in international theory—all of them US IR experts—believe that this view is
accurate. However, they do agree that the importance of religion: (1) in international
relations has never been as marginal as secular-minded IR scholars would have it, and (2)
has been growing in recent decades. For example, in many countries, especially but not
only in the global south, religion is increasing its importance and profile, often as a form of
populist politics which followed a general discrediting of secular political ideologies, such
as ‘African socialism’, ‘Arab socialism’ and (unqualified) communism.
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Like Huntington, Vendulka Kubálková (2000, 2003) introduced a novel and extensive
theory of religion into analysis of international relations. As with Huntington, she was
also critiqued. For over 20 years, since an initial 2000 article in the IR journal, Millennium,
Kubálková developed her paradigm of ‘International Political Theology’ (IPT). Kubálková’s
IPT is a particularistic approach to constructivism. For Kubálková, it is essential to consider
an ontological distinction between two worldviews: the secular and the religious. She
contends that this allows us to bear in mind that religious actors may see the world
differently, compared to secular, often positivist, approaches in the social sciences. For
Kubálková, the key difference is that religious worldviews recognise multiple realities
not necessarily ‘sensed’ by non-religious approaches. Fitzgerald (2011) is a key critic
of Kubálková’s analysis. In particular, he takes issue with a central component of her
approach: the division between secular and religious ontologies. Fitzgerald critiques
Kubálková for what he sees as her” Christocentric assumptions” (162),” wild fabrications”
(163) and ”completely circular” arguments (Fitzgerald 2011, p. 164). In addition, Fitzgerald
criticises Kubálková for her attempt” to identify the essential characteristics of ‘religion,’
and therefore of all ‘religions’”. Fitzgerald is pointing to a frequently expressed concern,
shared by other analysts, such as Hurd (2008): it is futile to try to capture the ‘essence’ of all
religions, as there is not one. In the view of Fitzgerald, this is conceptually impossible since
some scholars of religion, including those interested in traditional Chinese religions, such
as Daoism, and those who focus on Sanskrit origins of Hinduism and the characteristics
of Tibetan Buddhism, “are themselves involved in complex published debates about the
relevance or validity of the term ‘religion’”. This is in part a definitional issue and in part
a comment about the claimed autonomy of religious and secular views. For Fitzgerald,
these issues significantly undermine Kubálková’s claim regarding a central ontological
difference between secular and religious worldviews. While ‘secular’ religions, including:
nationalism, communism, socialism and humanism, undoubtedly arouse both passion
and intensity, Fitzgerald argues that Kubálková probably understands that pursuing this
investigative line would ultimately ”weaken her claim that religion and the secular are
ontologically distinct” (Fitzgerald 2011, p. 163).
Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008, 2015) is another scholar who has introduced a novel
way of thinking about religion in international relations. Hurd (2008) argues that the
long-term value of a core concept and practice—secularism—in international relations can
be usefully thought of not as an opposite—a mirror image—of religion but rather as an
analogous kind of worldview that draws on and competes with religious views. This can
be seen in both domestic and international contexts. In the latter, many states’ foreign
policies are overtly, explicitly and consistently secular. The main thrust of Hurd’s theoretical
repositioning highlights that the topic of religion is both ubiquitous and distinctive. This
implies a conceptual readjustment to view international relations ‘appropriately’, without
abandoning insights from IR’s mainstream (secular) models. Hurd is critiqued by Philpott
and Shah (2016, p. 385) when she claims that ”the constructs of “expert” and “governed
religion” presupposes that there are genuinely “lived” or “everyday” religious phenomena
that are distinct, identifiable, and not pure constructs imposed from above”. In Beyond
Religious Freedom, Hurd (2015, p. 7) states that: “Religion does not stand outside or prior to
other histories and institutions. Religious practices unfold amid and are entangled in all
domains of human life, forms of belonging, work, play, governance, violence, and exchange.
Religion cannot be singled out from these other aspects of human experience, and yet also
cannot simply be identified with these either”. However, this does not convince Philpott
and Shah (2016, p. 385) who assert that: “[i]f religion is entirely indeterminate, such claims
are unintelligible. They can only be proffered by someone who is fully confident that she
can name and understand “religion” and “religious practices” in ways that are superior to
prevailing understandings and that penetrate the false boundaries and distinctions other
analysts erect between religion and non-religious phenomena”.
The work of the scholars we have briefly examined—that of Sandal and Fox, Thomas,
Huntington, Kubálková and Hurd—have many differences, both conceptual and defi-
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nitional. Three aspects are, however, common to them all: they (1) draw attention to
religion’s increased presence in international relations/International Relations, (2) main-
tain that traditional mainstream secular IR theories and concepts are unable to grasp this
phenomenon adequately and (3) unwarrantedly overlook or undervalue religious factors
in their analyses. Collectively, their analyses authoritatively undermine the traditional IR
claim that to ignore or underestimate religion in international relations/IR is to wilfully
ignore the plethora of empirical evidence of its importance in helping explain, at least, some
international outcomes. Their accounts provide much thought and will help other scholars
to hone and develop their own theories of the significance of religion and international
relations/International Relations.
The final approach to the understanding of what religion does in international rela-
tions/International Relations (ir/IR) in this article is that ‘religious soft power’, which,
although relatively recently advanced, may be the most currently influential approach to
the topic. This is a constructivist approach which examines religion’s impact on ir/IR. It
is applied to both state and non-state actors. Haynes (2012) provides an overview of the
religious soft power of the latter—focusing on American Evangelical Protestants, Roman
Catholics, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and Sunni extremist groups, including
al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Mandaville and Hamid (2018) and Öztürk (2021) examine
the religious soft power of various governments, including those of Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, Morocco and Turkey, while Jödicke (2018) edited book looks at religious soft
power in the Caucasus (that is, Turkey, Russia-Georgia relations, Azerbaijan and Armenia).
Mandaville and Hamid argue that in Egypt, Morocco and Jordan, “religious institutions
associated with the government have been promoted as purveyors of a “moderate Islam”
capable of defeating the ideology of groups like ISIS”. Thus, religious soft power can be a
tool of both state and non-state actors. Öztürk (2021) looks at the case of Turkey and its
Islam-informed foreign policy in the Balkans. These examples highlight the significance
of religious transnational actors and of governments which also employ such a tool to
encourage the spread and development of certain values and norms, which often impact
on insecurity and order.
Kearn (2011) critiques the concept of religious soft power for its alleged ambiguity.
Jödicke’s edited book, Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus, states that his ”contribu-
tors . . . agreed to use the concept in an investigative sense and with a heuristic purpose, to
identify a variety of constellations in which religions play a political role in transnational
relations” (Jödicke 2018, p. 2). This highlights Kearn’s critique of religious soft power: the
unclear relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘power’. For example, it is not necessarily the
case that religious soft power—that is, the capacity to encourage an actor to behave in a
certain way because of their religious beliefs—is necessarily ‘soft’ or benign. Instead, it
can be maligned—think of the soft power of al Qaeda or Islamic State—and aligned with
nationalism—as in the case of Turkey during the rule of President Erdoğan, Iran since the
Islamic Revolution and the USA during the Trump presidency—and the overall result is an
amalgam of soft and hard power which brings together both state and non-state actors for
a variety of goals.
4. Conclusions
This article was concerned with how religion can usefully be brought into concepts,
theories or paradigms of international relations. We saw that some scholars—such as,
Huntington and Kubálková—believe that a new theory of IR is necessary to explain
this. Fox and Sandal, on the other hand, contend that it is possible to accommodate the
multiple ways in which religion and international relations interact by adapting existing
IR theories to incorporate religion’s influence. Finally, there are partial theories—such as
those of Thomas, Hurd, and that of the various exponents of religious soft power, such as
Mandaville and Hamid and Öztürk—who argue that religion’s influence is most significant
in specific ways and in specific contexts related to religion’s power in relation to other
aspects of that phenomenon.
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Overall, the article sought briefly to survey the scholarly study of ‘religion and interna-
tional relations/International Relations’ at the start of the third decade of the 21st century.
It argues that since the late 1970s, jumpstarted by the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the topic
emerged. As it developed, it was identified/identifiable as a discrete area of study: ‘religion
and international relations/International Relations’. The article contends that its study was
separated into two chronological periods: pre-9 September 2001 (‘9/11′) (late 1970s—11
September 2001) and post 9/11 (post-9 September 2001). The first period was consequential
to Iran’s Islamic revolution, and, in addition, Huntington presented his influential ‘clash of
civilisations’ paradigm. The second period, post-9 September 2001, saw a growing number
of scholarly accounts focusing on religion in international relations. Many regarded 9/11
as pivotal and highly influential in helping remake US foreign policy, as for the next two
decades, successive US governments seemed fixated on Islamist extremism and terrorism.
Over time, however, characterised by the apparently significant diminution of the threat
to the West of Islamist terrorism following the apparent demise of Islamic State and the
fragmentation and reduction in influence of al Qaeda, new foci appeared in relation to the
role(s) of religion in international relations/ International Relations.
We posed a question at the beginning of the article: When it comes to the association
of religion and international relations, what do we know and how do we know it? To what
extent do we need to change our perception of religion’s (relatively minor but not marginal)
impact on international relations in order to make better IR theory? Completing our brief
survey, it seems clear that there is no succinct answer to these questions. In response to
the first—What do we know?—we observed that empirical events help explain the rise
and fall of concern with the role of religion in international relations, and that theoretical
innovation needs to take ‘real world’ events into account to make better theory. In response
to the second question—How do we know it?—we engaged with evidence that scholars
focus on what they think is most important and that there are various methodological and
theoretical ways to find out more about the issue that they examine. There is no single way
to make theoretical progress in explaining and understanding the role(s) of religion in IR
theory.
How then can we conclude our necessarily brief survey of the ‘universe’ of religion in
IR theory? We inhabit a hierarchical and multipolar, but also interdependent and multilat-
eral, global system. Its development is contextualised by events of the last three decades or
so, that is, since the game-changing end of the Cold War. We have seen, however, that for IR
theory, while religion is not a ‘game changer’, its various manifestations—expressed in the
actions and reactions of both states and transnational non-state actors and captured in spe-
cific events, such as the Iranian revolution and especially 9/11—can, at times and in relation
to certain issues, be highly significant with long-term ramifications affecting international
relations in a number of ways and with various outcomes. It does not follow, however, that
religion’s ‘return’ to international relations/International Relations means that we must
fundamentally adjust our understanding of how international relations ‘works’ or Interna-
tional Relations is theorised. IR’s enduring fascination with states has not been sidelined by
the advent—or return—of religion to the analytical frame. States are still highly important,
and most are always or very often secular in their international foci and activities. The
result is that when it comes to religion’s impact on IR theory, the evidence suggests that
existing IR theories have not (yet) been superseded, despite the fact that, collectively, they
see little or no consistent significance for religion. Religion remains an intriguing but
opaque component of how we understand international relations/International Relations.
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Notes
1 Reus-Smit (2005, p. 211) defines culture as a broad ”framework on inter-subjective meanings and practices that give
a society a distinctive character . . . ”.
2 By April 2021, Thomas’s 2005 book, The Global Transformation of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations. The
Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, had been cited just under 900 times, making it one of the most cited
analyses of the role of religion in international relations (accessed on 7 May 2021).
3 ‘The number of casualties was enormous [although] uncertain. Estimates of total casualties range from 1,000,000 to
twice that number.’ https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War (accessed on 7 May 2021).
4 ‘International relations’ (small i, small r) refers to relations between the world’s governments. A more inclusive
definition understands international relations as both more comprehensive and interdisciplinary. This ‘broad’
understanding of international relations not only engages with subject matter drawn from various fields of study but
also includes a focus on both state and non-state actors, involving economics, politics, security studies and history.
‘International Relations’ (capital I, capital R) is the academic study of the discipline. One which has its theories and
paradigms.
5 Hassner’s most cited work on Google Scholar, with more than 300 citations on 26 March 2021, is War on Sacred Grounds,
Cormell University Press, 2009.
6 RFIA has published many articles on international religious freedom over the years, including special issues in 2008
and 2013 https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rfia20/current (accessed on 7 May 2021).
7 In this context, ‘culture’ may include religion but it not restricted to it. An example is the work of Huntington (1993,
1996) who uses the term ‘civilisation’ rather than ‘culture’. Huntington wants to include various factors which make
up the identity of discrete groups of people, including but not restricted to religion.
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